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ARTICLES
MEDIA ETHICS AND MEDIA LAW: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION
INTO LEGAL PRINCIPLEt
ROBERT E. DRECHSEL*
"Law is the great civilizing agent that it is... because it is a
working partner with the advancing ethical sense of the com-
munity," the philosopher William Ernest Hocking wrote in
1937.' Ten years later, as a member of the Commission on
Freedom of the Press,2 Hocking was to write what remains the
definitive statement of the social responsibility theory of the
pressS-a theory premised on the idea that the press has come
to play so essential and important a role for individuals and
society that it has "lost the common and ancient human liberty
t © 1991 by Robert E. Drechsel
* Professor and Director, School of Journalism and Mass
Communication, University of Wisconsin-Madison. B.A., M.A., Ph.D.,
University of Minnesota. The author wishes to acknowledge his research
assistant, Stacy Huang, for her invaluable assistance with statistical analysis of
survey data. He also wishes to thank his colleague, Professor Jack McLeod,
for inviting the author to participate in the larger study of which the data
reported here are a part.
1. William E. Hocking, Ways of Thinking About Rights: A New Theory of the
Relation Between Law and Morals, in 2 LAW: A CENTURY OF PROGRESS 242, 258
(1937).
2. The Commission, created at the behest of Henry R. Luce and funded
primarily by Time, Inc., consisted of Robert M. Hutchins, Zechariah Chafee
Jr., John M. Clark, John Dickinson, William E. Hocking, Harold D. Lasswell,
Archibald MacLeish, Charles E. Merriam, Reinhold Niebuhr, Robert
Redfield, Beardsley Huml, Arthur M. Schlesinger and George N. Shuster. Its
goal was to inquire into the present state and future prospects of freedom of
the press. It issued its report and several companion volumes in 1947 after
holding 17 meetings, studying 176 documents and hearing testimony from
58 individuals connected with the press and more than 225 representatives of
industry, government, and private agencies concerned with the press.
COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS v-vi
(1947).
3. WILLIAM E. HOCKING, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS: A FRAMEWORK OF
PRINCIPLE (1947).
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to be deficient in its function...."- As the Commission con-
cluded, "the important thing is that the press accept the public
standard and try for it. The legal right will stand if the moral
right is realized or tolerably approximated." 5
Such linkage of moral obligation and legal rights has led
more than one commentator to worry that, especially to the
degree that the news media themselves embrace the concept of
social responsibility, they may unwittingly be inviting the incur-
sion of law into what heretofore have been ethical questions.6
These critics fear that by aggressively espousing specific ethical
standards of professional conduct, the media may be implying
that they have accepted concomitant legal duties.7 Therefore,
4. COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 2, at 131.
5. Id. The commission concluded that the press has a responsibility to
provide a
truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent account of the day's events
in a context which gives them meaning; ... a forum for the exchange
of comment and criticism; ... a means of projecting the opinions
and attitudes of the groups in the society to one another; .. . a
method of presenting and clarifying the goals and values of the
society; and.., a way of reaching every member of the society by the
currents of information, thought, and feeling which the press
supplies.
Id. at 20-21.
6. For a summary of this concern and a review of litigation bearing on
it, see Robert E. Drechsel, Media Malpractice: the Legal Risks of Voluntary Social
Responsibility in Mass Communication, 27 DUQ. L. REV. 237 (1989). The social
responsibility ethic is manifest in a variety of news media ethics codes. "The
primary purpose of gathering and distributing news and opinion is to serve the
general welfare by informing the people and enabling them to make judgments
on the issues of the time." AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS,
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES (1975) (emphasis added). "The public's right to know
of events of public importance and interest is the overriding mission of the
mass media. The purpose of distributing news and enlightened opinion is to
serve the general welfare. Journalists who use their professional status as
representatives of the public for selfish or other unworthy motives violate a high
trust." SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS CODE OF ETHICS (1987)
(emphasis added).
7. See, e.g., JOHN C. MERRILL, THE IMPERATIVE OF FREEDOM (1974);
William W. Van Alstyne, The Hazards to the Press of Claiming a 'Preferred Position',
28 HASTINGS L.J. 761 (1977); Ronald Dworkin, Is the Press Losing the First
Amendment?, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Dec. 4, 1980, at 49; Gilbert Cranberg,
Searching for 'Fault'.- Libel Judges are Setting Standards for the Press, WASH.
JOURNALISM REV., Sept. 1989, at 42; see also Connie Bruck, The Mea Culpa
Defense: How CBS Brought on the Westmoreland Suit-and Sacrificed One of Its Own,
AM. LAW., Sept. 1983, at 82; Paul A. Weiss, Who's Watching the Watchdog?" Self-
Evaluative Privilege and Journalistic Responsibility in Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 7
COMM./ENT. LJ. 149 (1984).
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it ought not be surprising to see increasing efforts in litigation
to expand the legal obligations of the press.8
Two cases decided by the United States Supreme Court
during 1991 have brought new urgency to this concern. In
Cohen v. Cowles Media,9 the Court held that the First Amend-
ment does not bar a promissory estoppel action against the
news media for violating a promise of confidentiality to a
source.' 0  And in Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.," the
Court held that a journalist can be held responsible in a libel
action for placing quotation marks around words a source has
never spoken, if the meaning conveyed results in a "material
change" from what the source actually said. 2 More directly
than any others to date, these cases remind journalists that the
boundary between law and ethics is fragile, ambiguous and
arbitrary. Heretofore, the questions of when ajournalist might
break a promise and how much liberty a journalist may take
with a source's words have fallen largely within the realm of
journalism ethics. Indeed, as they s'earched for arguments, the
courts and litigants in both Cohen and Masson cited the litera-
ture of media ethics.1
3
This article suggests that journalists themselves bear
responsibility for muddying the boundary between law and eth-
ics. But its larger goal is to move beyond the qualitative per-
spective from which most writers have pondered the confusion
of the media's moral and legal responsibilities.' 4 To do so, the
article begins with the assumption that if the media themselves
accept the role of public trustees, it would seem inevitable that
the public would also expect the media to play such a role.
8. For numerous examples of such pressUre for increased recognition
of legal duties, see Drechsel, supra note 6, at 252-72. See also Juliet
Lushbough Dee, Media Accountability for Real-Life Violence: A Case of Negligence or
Free Speech, J. COMM., Spring 1987, at 106; Robert E. Drechsel, Media Tort
Liability for Physical Harm, 64 JOURNALISM Q. 99 (1987); George E. Stevens,
Newspaper Liability for Harmful Advice, NEWSPAPER RES. J., July 1982, at 46.
9. 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991).
10. Id. at 2516.
11. 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
12. Id. at 2433.
13. See infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
14. See also J. HERBERT ALTSCHULL, AGENTS OF POWER: THE ROLE OF
THE NEWS MEDIA IN HUMAN AFFAIRS 301-05 (1984). One empirical study has
examined newspaper editors' opinions about whether having written ethics
standards might increase their vulnerability to legal actions. See Lynn
Wickham Hartman, Standards Governing the News: Their Use, Their Character, and
Their Legal Implications, 72 IOWA L. REV. 637 (1987). About a fourth of the
editors expressed such concern. Id. at 653. See generally sources cited supra
note 7.
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Then it uses survey research in an effort to see whether there is
evidence that members of the public associate what they con-
sider the moral obligations of the press with their willingness
or reluctance to protect the press'siegal freedom.15 If such a
relationship exists, it will support the critics of social responsi-
bility theory, and indicate that litigation attempting to expand
the boundaries of the media's legal :duties may represent more
than the clever legal maneuvering of lawyers in aberrant cases.
Indeed, it would suggest that the public not only embraces
social responsibility theory, but also may be confusing: moral
obligation with legal obligation.
16
The article begins by elaborating briefly on the Cohen and
Masson cases as examples of how the news media may be
becoming increasingly legally bound by the ethical standards
and public trusteeship model they espouse. Then the article
turns to a survey of public attitudes about the media's moral
and legal obligations in an effort to see to what degree the pub-
lic is willing to legally enforce what it considers the news
media's ethical obligations. Finally, the article argues that,
given the media's own acceptance of social responsibility the-
ory and the public's willingness to use legal coercion to enforce
its view of the media's moral duties, the outcomes of such cases
as Cohen and Masson should come as little surprise.
I. COHEN AND MASSON: MORAL AND LEGAL OBLIGATION
INTERTWINED
Journalists have long, loudly and publicly proclaimed the
sanctity of confidential reporter-source relationships. Indeed,
a recent national survey found that nearly four out of five
15. The article uses the terms "press," "media," and "news media"
interchangeably. It also uses the terms "publish" and "publication"
generically to apply to dissemination by print or electronic media.
16. A number of other studies have gathered data on the public's views
of media responsibility and on the public's support for press freedom. For an
excellent summary, see D.C. WHITNEY, THE MEDIA AND THE PEOPLE (1985)
(working paper from Gannett Center for Media Studies, New York). The
empirical literature on political tolerance is considerable, but has paid
surprisingly little attention to specific issues involving freedom of the press.
See, e.g., John Immerwahr &John Doble, Public Attitudes Toward Freedom of the
Press, 46 PUB. OPINION Q. 177 (1982); HERBERT MCCLOSKY & ALIDA BRILL,
DIMENSIONS OF TOLERANCE: WHAT AMERICANS BELIEVE ABOUT CIVIL
LIBERTIES (1983); SAMUEL A. STOUFFER, COMMUNISM, CONFORMITY AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES (1955); W. Cody Wilson, Belief in Freedom of Speech and Press, 31 J.
Soc. ISSUES 69 (Spring 1975). Nor have these studies looked for
relationships between the public's views of the media's moral obligations and
public tolerance for press freedom.
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American newspaper editors believe that journalists should
have an absolute right to refuse to reveal the names of sources
to whom confidentiality has been promised. 7 In less absolute
terms, the general public apparently agrees." In Branzburg v.
Hayes,' 9 however, the Supreme Court rejected journalists'
argument that the First Amendment shields them from having
to reveal confidential names and information to grand juries
conducting good faith criminal investigations.2 °
Cohen v. Cowles Media raised the complementary issue of
whether the First Amendment shields a journalist from liability
where the journalist has broken a promise of confidentiality to
a source. Cohen, a political operative, had given reporters
damaging information about an opposing political candidate
on the condition that he not be identified. When two newspa-
pers broke their reporters' promises and publicly named him,
his employer fired him and he sued the newspapers for breach
of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation. 2' A jury
awarded $700,000 damages.22 The Minnesota Court of
Appeals ruled that fraudulent misrepresentation had not been
proved, and struck that portion of the damages. 2' But it
affirmed the $200,000 awarded for breach of contract.2 4 The
Minnesota Supreme Court struck the remaining breach of con-
tract award on grounds that there was no contract: "The law,
however, does not create a contract where the parties intended
none.... The parties understand that the reporter's promise
17. ROBERT O. WYATT, FREE EXPRESSION AND THE AMERICAN EDITOR 5
(1991) (survey results presented to the American Society of Newspaper
Editors) (copy on file with the author). Wyatt's findings are similar to those
of earlier research. See, e.g., DAVID WEAVER & CLEVELAND G. WILHOIT, THE
AMERICAN JOURNALIST 127 (1986) (national survey of 1,001 journalists finds
only 5% of respondents agree that it may be justified to breach a promise of
confidentiality to a source). But see PHILLIP MEYER, EThICAL JOURNALISM 208-
09 (1987) (national survey finds that 71% of editors and 51% of newspaper
staffers agree that confidentiality may be violated in "unusual circumstances,
as when it is learned the source lied to the reporter").
18. WYATT, supra note 17, at 13 (available from the American Society of
Newspaper Editors Foundation, Washington, D.C.). The national, random
sample of 1500 American adults found that 36% would grant the press an
absolute right to maintain confidentiality and another 42% would grant such
a right "sometimes." Id.
19. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
20. Id. at 667.
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of anonymity is given as a moral commitment, but a moral obli-
gation alone will not support a contract. "25
The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, did not stop with
its analysis of contract liability. On its own, it raised the ques-
tion of whether the newspapers might be liable under a theory
of promissory estoppel-the doctrine holding that "a promise
expected or reasonably expected to induce definite action by
the promisee that does induce action is binding if injustice can
be avoided only by enforcing the promise."' 26 Despite its
refusal to address the reporter-source relationship in contract
terms, the court -was willing to do so under the rubric of prom-
issory estoppel2 7 -despite the court's concession that doing so
would require judges to second-guess journalists on such ques-
tions as whether a source's name was newsworthy or necessary
for making a story fair and balanced.
28
Nevertheless, the court found that imposing liability for
promissory estoppel would violate the First Amendment in this
instance largely because the promise and its breach occurred in
the "classic First Amendment context of the quintessential
public debate in our democratic society, namely, a political
source involved in a political campaign.
'
"29
The United States Supreme Court placed Cohen in a cate-
gory of cases holding that laws of general application do not
violate the First Amendment merely because they may inciden-
tally affect the news media's ability to gather and report news.
30
The Court also distinguished Cohen from cases immunizing the
press from liability for publishing truthful information of pub-
lic concern.3 ' It did so on grounds that rather than define the
type of content that would trigger liability, Minnesota's law of
promissory estoppel "simply requires those making promises
to keep them. The parties themselves, as in this case, deter-
mine the scope of their legal obligations and any restrictions
which may be placed on the publication of truthful information
25. 457 N.W.2d 199, 203 (1990). The court concluded that "to impose
contract theory on this arrangement puts an unwarranted legal rigidity on a
special ethical relationship. Id.
26. Id. at 203-04.
27. "There may be instances where a confidential source would be
entitled to a remedy such as promissory estoppel, when the state's interest in
enforcing the promise to the source outweighs First Amendment
considerations .... Id. at 205.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 111 S. Ct. at 2518.
31. Id. at 2519.
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are self-imposed. '3 2 Then, the Court returned the case to the
Minnesota Supreme Court so that it could consider, the First
Amendment aside, whether a promissory estoppel claim had
been established.33
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., by contrast, stemmed
not from violation of an explicit promise, but from alleged vio-
lation of one of journalism's cardinal principles: journalists
"should guard against inaccuracies, carelessness, bias or distor-
tion through either emphasis or omission. ' 34 The result was a
suit in which Jeffrey Masson, a psychoanalyst who had become
the focus of controversy over certain of his views about
Sigmund Freud, sued The New Yorker and author Janet
Malcolm for libel. In question was an article which contained
a number of statements presented as verbatim quotation of
remarks Masson made in interviews with Malcolm but which
he denied having made. 35 These quotations, Masson alleges,
falsely depicted him as arrogant, dishonest and unpro-
fessional.36
Masson conceded that he was a public figure for purposes
of his libel action.3 ' This status compelled him to prove that
Malcolm published the defamatory quotations with actual mal-
ice-either with knowledge that they were false or with reckless
disregard for the truth.3 1 Masson therefore argued that, cor-
rections in grammar and syntax aside, "publication of a quota-
tion with knowledge that it does not contain the words the
public figure used demonstrates actual malice."3 9
32. Id. Of course, this might be seen as a direct transformation of the
ethical into the legal. The ethical judgments made by both the source and
the journalist at the time of their interaction literally sets terms that become
legally enforceable.
33. Id. at 2520. The Court did observe that the Minnesota Supreme
Court might find its state constitution to shield journalists from promissory
estoppel claims. Id.
34. CODE OF ETHICS OF THE ASSOCIATED PRESS MANAGING EDITORS
ASSOCIATION (1975).
35. See Masson, III S. Ct. at 2424-28.
36. Masson's specific allegation of defamation is best stated by the
court of appeals. See 895 F.2d 1535, 1536 (9th Cir. 1989). The ways in which
fabricated verbatim quotation might create defamatory meaning are
addressed by the Supreme Court in a more general sense. Such a quotation
might attribute an untrue factual assertion to the speaker, or, regardless of
the truth of the factual matters asserted within the quoted statement, the
attribution may harm reputation "because the manner of the expression or
even the fact that the statement was made indicates a negative personal trait
or an attitude the speaker does not hold." 111 S. Ct. at 2430.
37. 895 F.2d at 1537.
38. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
39. Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2431.
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The court of appeals held that actual malice will not be
inferred so long as the altered or fabricated quotations are
either rational interpretations of ambiguous remarks or do not
change the substantive content of unambiguous remarks the
plaintiff actually made.4" The Supreme Court adopted a differ-
ent standard: "deliberate alteration of the words uttered by a
plaintiff does not equate with knowledge of falsity . . .unless
the alteration results in a material change in the meaning conveyed by
the statement."'" The Court then applied this standard to the
quotations in question, found that the alterations could sup-
port a finding of actual malice, and reversed the appellate court
judgment in favor of the defendants.42
Cohen and Masson split the journalistic community itself. In
Cohen, journalists testified for both sides.43 In Masson, a group
of journalists and journalism professors filed an amicus brief
on behalf of Masson. They argued in part that the press
receives constitutional protection because it serves as a conduit
for diverse views, and that permitting deliberate misquotation
of public figures would corrupt the marketplace of ideas.4 4
They also filed with the Court a variety of materials to demon-
strate current standards of professional practice in journalistic
quotation. 45 The respondents specifically challenged the use-
fulness of such material, arguing that it demonstrates differ-
ences of opinion regarding professional practice that should
not be debated in the context of libel litigation.46
Litigants and judges in both cases also cited directly to the
literature on journalistic ethics. For example, the Minnesota
Supreme Court in Cohen drew on a Columbia Journalism
Review article for examples of situations in which it might be
ethical to breach promises of confidentiality. 47 In Masson, a dis-
40. 895 F.2d at 1539.
41. Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2433 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
42. Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2434-37. The Court's conclusion does not, of
course, constitute a finding that Malcolm did falsify any quotations. Masson
was appealing a grant of summary judgment to the defendants. Therefore,
his allegations were assumed to be true for purposes of the motion, and the
Supreme Court merely held that Masson had offered evidence sufficient to
create a jury question as to whether there was actual malice. Id. at 2434-35.
43. See Brief of Petitioner at 7-9, Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., I11 S. Ct.
2513 (1991) (No. 90-634).
44. Brief Amicus Curiae of Certain Journalists and Academics in
Support of Petitioner, Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Il1 S. Ct. 2419
(1991) (No. 89-1799).
45. Id.
46. Brief for Respondents at 21, Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, I I l
S. Ct. 2419 (1991) (No. 89-1799).
47. 457 N.W.2d at 202 n.4.
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senting judge on the court of appeals-one whose views were
ultimately vindicated by the U.S. Supreme Court decision-
drew extensively on the literature of journalism ethics, text-
books on reporting, and The New Yorker's own internal poli-
cies to support the proposition that fabricating direct quotation
violates professional standards.4" "I am unable to construe the
first amendment as granting journalists a privilege to engage in
practices they themselves frown upon," he wrote.49
Cohen and Masson by no means represent the first time the
Supreme Court has opened the door to putting legal sanction
behind journalistic ethics. To some degree, the actual malice
standard itself does so. It compels examination of the defend-
ant's legal fault, which often can be established only by the
compounding of circumstantial evidence.50 Such evidence may
well include allegations that the defendant inexplicably failed
to take precautions that most journalists would regard among
their most fundamental obligations-seeking additional
sources where existing sources have an obvious bias, for exam-
ple, or trying to verify an inherently improbable allegation, or
contacting the sources best positioned to know the truth.5
But it was the development of libel law beginning with
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.52 that most directly injected journal-
ism's heretofore moral obligations into the law of libel. In
Gertz, the Supreme Court permitted states to allow private-fig-
ure libel plaintiffs to win upon a showing of fault less than
actual malice.5" The standard of choice has become negli-
gence.5 4 By requiring proof of failure to use due care, the neg-
ligence standard invites arguments that such failure is
demonstrated by journalists' failure to follow their own profes-
sional standards. Plaintiffs have subpoenaed the news media's
ethics codes and internal policies, as well as internal investiga-
48. 895 F.2d at 1549-63 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 1562.
50. "[A] plaintiff is entitled to prove the defendant's state of mind
through circumstantial evidence." Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v.
Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 668 (1989).
51. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968); Harte-Hanks
Communications, 491 U.S. at 689-93.
52. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
53. "[S]o long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States
may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher
or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual." Id.
at 347.
54. For perhaps the most up-to-date listing of standards developed by
the states, see 1 COMMUNICATIONS LAw 1990 145-52 (Practicing Law Institute
Course Handbook). See also William Watson Hopkins, Negligence 10 Years After
Gertz v. Robert Welch, 93 JOURNALISM MONOGRAPHS 1 (1985).
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tions of mistakes.5 5 Indeed, several legal writers have assumed
that allowing the press to use its own standards of professional
conduct as a yardstick for measuring legal fault will actually
help the press.5"
The press itself has long argued for extensions of First
Amendment rights based on the idea that it is a vital public
servant-a surrogate or trustee for the public. Professor
Timothy Gleason, for example, sees the so-called "watchdog"
rationale for freedom of the press as having emerged in signifi-
cant part from newspapers' efforts to gain more protection
from libel suits in the nineteenth century.5 The same, broad
trusteeship argument underlies journalists' claims ranging
55. See, e.g., Richard P. Cunningham, Who Said What About Whom?,
QUILL, Mar. 1985, at 7, 8 (reporting attempt by plaintiff's attorney to use
critical columns by newspaper's ombudsman to establish fault); Does Your
Newspaper Have A Code of Ethics?, ASNE BULL., Dec. 1987, at 8 (newspaper
reports having its ethics policy subpoenaed twice); Westmoreland v. CBS,
601 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (network's internal investigation of
procedures followed in preparing allegedly defamatory documentary is not
inherently privileged from plaintiff's discovery). One recent study found that
newspapers' written standards have been used in very few reported cases. See
Hartman, supra note 14, at 656. Even if admitted as evidence, such evidence
is likely to be of limited value in establishing actual malice, although it may be
more relevant in negligence cases. Id. at 665. Another study, after analyzing
947 libel cases decided between 1976 and 1990, has concluded that:
Out of the body of .. .libel cases is emerging a body of journalistic
standards that the press ignores at its peril. Ironically, standards
that press groups regard with such dread, and shun as too
dangerous to compose for voluntary adherence, are being created-
and enforced-by an arm of the government with power to levy
severe penalties for non-compliance.
John Soloski, Libel Law and Journalistic Malpractice: A Preliminary Analysis
of Fault in Libel Litigation 4 (1991) (paper presented to the annual conven-
tion of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communica-
tion, Boston) (copy on file with the author).
56. See, e.g., Todd F. Simon, Libel as Malpractice: News Media Ethics and
the Standard of Care, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 449 (1984); Hopkins, supra note 54,
at 18; Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Proof of Fault in Media Defamation Litigation, 38
VAND. L. REV. 247, 343 (1985); David A. Anderson, Libel and Press Self-
Censorship, 53 TEX. L. REV. 422, 466-67 (1975). There is some evidence to
support this view. An analysis of recent libel cases has found that the media
are seldom held to be negligent if they can show they have followed accepted
journalistic practices. Soloski, supra note 55, at 18.
57. TIMOTHY W. GLEASON, THE WATCHDOG CONCEPT 13 (1990). The
"watchdog concept" is the idea that the news media deserve special
protection from being sued for publishing matters of public concern because
the media have a social duty to gather and report information about the
operation of government and other matters of public interest. Id. at 4.
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from the right to withhold confidential information" to rights
of access to places, people and documents. 59
Likewise, discussion and debate over alternatives to litiga-
tion for resolving disputes between the public and the press are
premised on the assumption that the press ought to be
accountable in some way for its actions.6" Although alterna-
tives to litigation may be preferable in the sense that they at
least partially distinguish between obligation in the moral sense
and in the legal sense, they nevertheless highlight the view that
the news media bear significant obligations to individuals and
to society.
To summarize, through arguments and issues presented in
litigation; through the debate over media accountability;
through non-legal mechanisms for making the media accounta-
ble; and through the media's own ethical statements, policies
and rationales for self-importance, the news media appear
largely to have accepted the mantle of social responsibility if
not public trusteeship. It should hardly be surprising, there-
fore, if the general public has high expectations of the news
media.
For the news media, the vocabularies of law and ethics can
be perilously similar. "The law is full of phraseology drawn
from morals," Oliver Wendell Holmes long ago pointed out,
"and by the mere force of language continually invites us to
pass from one domain to the other without perceiving it, as we
are sure to do unless we have the boundary constantly before
our minds."'" Benjamin Cardozo described the evolution from
morality to law as follows:
58. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
59. See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438
U.S. 1 (1978) (press has no first amendment right of access to prisons and
jails beyond access rights of general public); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (press and public have qualified first
amendment fight to attend criminal trials); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Riverside
County Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (press and public have qualified
first amendment right to attend voir dire in criminal cases); Press-Enterprise
Co. v. Riverside County Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (press and public
have qualified first amendment right to attend pretrial hearings in criminal
cases).
60. See, e.g., BEYOND THE COURTROOM: ALTERNATIVES FOR RESOLVING
PRESS DISPUTES (R. Kaplar ed., 1991); MEDIA FREEDOM AND ACcOUNTABILITY
(Everette E. Dennis et al. eds., 1989). The literature on media ethics has
exploded during the past decade, and has become too massive to cite briefly.
61. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459-
60 (1897). Holmes cited "rights," "duties," "malice," "intent," and
"negligence" as examples of such phraseology. Id. at 460. More recently,
19921
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[T]hejudge stretches a point here in response to a moral
urge, or makes a new application of a precedent there.
Before long a new tradition has arisen. Duties that had
been conceived of as moral only, without other human
sanction than the opinion of society, are found to be such
that they may effectively and wisely be subjected to
another form of sanction, the power of society. The
moral norm and the jural have been brought together,
and are one.
62
It is quite reasonable, therefore, to expect that if the moral
and legal merge easily in the judicial mind, the same happens
among journalists and the public. Journalists' and public views
of media morality matter because to the degree that they may
be seen as inputs or resources in judicial decision-making, they
may facilitate the process of legalizing moral principles. We
have already noted how journalists, as amici, as litigants and in
their roles as journalists may be encouraging the transforma-
tion of certain professional standards into legal standards. We
turn now to the general public and to the question of whether
there is a relationship between the public's beliefs about the
moral obligations of the press and the public's support for the
press's legal freedom.
II. THE PUBLIC, MEDIA ETHICS AND MEDIA LAW
If there is no relationship between the public's views of the
media's moral and legal obligations, we can assume that law
and ethics occupy separate dimensions in the public mind.
And if so, we can assume that at least some of the fears of
critics of social responsibility theory-namely that voluntary
social responsibility may boomerang and become an invitation
to legal coercion-may be unfounded. But if there is a rela-
tionship between what the public considers to be the press'
moral obligations and willingness to support legal controls on
the press, the critics' concerns will gain credibility.
To gather data to address these issues, 300 randomly
selected residents of Dane County, Wisconsin, were surveyed
Samuel Stumpf has warned that "if the association of law with morality is too
close, then the law will become the substitute for our moral standards; and if
the law is our moral standard, we have lost the possibility of a moral criticism
of the law." SAMUEL E. STUMPF, MORALITY AND THE LAw 219 (1966).
62. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 43
(1928). See also HENRYJ. STEINER, MORAL ARGUMENT AND SOCIAL VISION IN
THE COURTS: A STUDY OF TORT ACCIDENT LAw 94 (1987) (moral ideals and
postulates about individuals and society affect the courts' social vision).
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by telephone in the fall of 1990.63 They were asked how
important they consider various roles played by the press, how
large a gap they see between the press roles they highly value
and the actual performance of the press, and what moral or
ethical obligations they believe the press to have. Then they
were asked to what degree they will tolerate legal freedom for
the press at the expense of other important interests.
A. Press Roles and Press Freedom
Table 1 shows the list of news media roles that was
presented to the respondents. Respondents were given 10-
point scales, then asked to indicate how important they consid-
ered each role and how good a job they thought the media
were doing in fulfilling it. The higher the score, the more
important the role and the better the performance of the
media.
63. The sample was drawn in a two-stage process. First, telephone
numbers were systematically sampled from the county telephone directory;
second, a variant of standard added-digit dialing procedures was used to
ensure access to unlisted numbers. Interviews were conducted by trained
graduate students and seniors enrolled in a research methods course. All
interviews were authenticated. Students living in university housing units
were excluded from the sample. The sample was relatively young (median
age of 39), well-educated (median of 15 years of education) and balanced in
terms of gender (57% female). Median household income fell in the range of
$20,000 to $30,000.
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TABLE 1




To give people a daily account of what's happening in
the world. 9.18 7.45
To provide a forum for a wide range of viewpoints on
important issues. 8.51 6.03
To take clear positions on issues to guide citizens'
decisions. 5.62 5.58
To help people play active roles in community
controversies. 7.02 5.48
To be a watchdog over the behavior of government
and government officials. 8.03 6.45
To promote projects that aid economic development
in the community. 7.37 5.84
(n = 300)
Notes:
' Respondents were asked, "For the following list of goals that people have suggested
the news media should try to accomplish, would you tell me how important you think it is
as a goal?" Respondents then applied a 10-point scale ranging from "not important at
all" to "extremely important."
b Respondents were asked, "For the same list of goals of the news media, I'd like you to
tell me how good a job the news media do." Respondents then applied a 10-point
scale ranging from a "poor job" to an "excellent job."
The individual roles, however, can be combined into cate-
gories to create larger indices. Aided by factor analysis, we cat-
egorized the items into an "informing role" index and an
"activating role" index.' The former is the more passive role
of providing descriptive coverage of issues or events and pro-
viding a forum for opinion; the latter is the more active role of
providing opinion leadership. The "informing role" index
measures the value respondents place on the media's role as
providers of daily accounts of events and as fora for a wide
range of viewpoints. The "activating role index" measures
64. Factor analysis is a statistical technique useful for finding
underlying patterns in sets of variables or items. In essence, it permits the
researcher to group individual items into larger indices with some confidence
that the individual items are empirically and, presumably, conceptually
related to each other. Factor analysis of the role items led us to discard two
of the individual items when we created our role indices. The informing role
index thus consists of two items: "to give people a daily account of what's
happening in the world" and "to provide a forum for a wide range of
viewpoints on important issues." The activating role index consisted of the
remaining two items: "to take clear positions on issues to guide citizens'
decisions" and "to help people play active roles in community
controversies." Technical results of the factor analysis may be obtained from
the author.
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support for the media's role as opinion leaders who help peo-
ple play active roles in community controversies.
Support for these two roles may affect support for press
freedom. To the degree that people highly value the informing
role, they may be supportive of press freedom because they do
not want legal restrictions to impede the flow of information
and viewpoints central to this function. In this context, a
strong relationship between moral obligation-measured here
by support for the informing role-and legal obligation may be
harmless and even functional for support for press freedom.
However, to the degree that people highly value the activating
role, more ambivalence seems likely. On the one hand, valuing
the activating role may be associated with support for press
freedom because legal restrictions may discourage the media
from playing a more participatory role in public affairs. On the
other, legal restriction may be more palatable if it furthers
interests one believes the press itself ought to be furthering.
In any event, valuing the informing role of the press ought
to be associated with stronger support for press freedom than
valuing the activating role. And, in general, the more strongly
people value an informing role for the press, the more support-
ive they should be of press freedom.
Just as central to the relationship between moral and legal
obligation, however, is the question of how well people believe
the press is performing in valued roles. We might logically
expect people who think the press is performing poorly on
roles they value to be less supportive of press freedom. They
will be more likely to support government intervention that
might punish the press for poor performance and/or
encourage better performance. Indeed, this is one of the
premises underlying social responsibility theory-government
intervention may be necessary if the press fails in significant
ways to uphold its moral obligations.
Since we had measures of both the importance respon-
dents attached to various roles and their rating of the media's
performance in these roles, it was possible to create what might
be called a "performance gap" variable. We did this by com-
paring the value respondents placed on various roles with the
rating respondents gave to the media's performance in those
roles. Conceptually, we were most interested in those respon-
dents who valued particular roles highly but were dissatisfied
with how well the press was fulfilling them. Thus, operation-
ally, we were interested in respondents who were above the
mean on the importance they attributed to any given role but
below the mean on how good ajob they saw the media doing in
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performing that role. These were the respondents to whom a
"performance gap" would seem to be meaningful. Respon-
dents who thought the press was satisfactorily performing roles
they valued, or was either adequately or inadequately perform-
ing roles they did not value, could be considered either satis-
fied or uninterested. In any event, we then created a larger
"performance gap" index by simply adding respondents' "per-
formance gap" scores on all of the roles about which they were
asked.6 5 Then we could compare performance gap scores with
support for press freedom.
B. Ethical Obligations and Press Freedom
Survey respondents were also presented with a list of
moral obligations often associated with the news media, and
asked to rate the importance of each of them on a 10-point
scale. Table 2 shows the list and the respondents' mean rating
of each. The higher the rating, the more obligated a respon-
dent considers the media to be.
Just as the role items were combined to create larger indi-
ces, several of the moral obligation items were combined to
create two larger indicators.66 One is the broad ethical obliga-
tion to be a neutral conduit of information and viewpoints.
The other is the obligation to avoid negative consequences that
might result from what the media disseminate. The former
might be called a "conduit" index, the latter an "impact"
index. A high score on the "conduit" index reflects the view
that the media are obligated to provide balanced treatment of
all groups and viewpoints, and to keep reporters' and editors'
personal views out of the news. A high score on the "impact"
index reflects the belief that the media have a strong ethical
obligation to take into account the impact of their actions on
individuals and society. 67 For example, a person might con-
65. To be more precise, for each possible role we divided respondents
into four groups: those above the mean on role importance but below the
mean on performance; those above the mean on role importance and above
the mean on role performance; those below the mean on role importance but
above the mean on role performance; and those below the mean on role
importance and below the mean on role performance. These four were then
given one of two values and collapsed into two groups-the "dissatisfieds"
and the "satisfieds/uninteresteds." We then summed these values across all
of the roles.
66. Again, factor analysis was used as an aid. As a result of the factor
analysis, several of the individual items were excluded from the resulting
indices. Technical results of the analysis are available from the author.
67. The items in this index included the obligations to avoid using
stories that might lead to conflict in the community, to mobilize support for
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sider the media highly obligated to avoid disseminating mate-
rial that could cause a person to do something harmful or to
cause social conflict.
TABLE 2
SUPPORT FOR NEWS MEDIA ETHICAL OBLIGATION
Obligation Mean*
To avoid using stories that might lead to conflict in the community. 4.56
To mobilize support for the government's policies in times of crisis. 6.16
To avoid stories that could stimulate a person to try something
dangerous. 5.70
To have balanced treatment in covering all groups and points of views. 8.60
To keep the personal views of reporters and editors out of the news
columns. 7.88
To investigate the practices of local businesses even if it might cause
loss of jobs. 6.95
To act as a representative of the public in seeking access to
newsworthy information and events. 8.13
To publish relevant information about public figures even if the
information is highly personal. 5.35
To gather information only by nondeceptive means. 7.03
(n = 300)
*Respondents were asked, "Regardless of any legal issues that might be involved, to
what degree are the news media morally or ethically obligated to do each of the following
things?" Respondents then used a 10-point scale ranging from "not obligated at all"
to "very much obligated."
Support for the idea that the media are obligated to be
neutral conduits would seem to be naturally associated with
support for press freedom, or at least for freedom from restric-
tions that might interfere directly with the conduit role. Belief
that the media are obliged to be concerned about their impact
may be associated with willingness to tolerate legal controls
designed to discourage the media from disseminating material
that might have negative consequences, or willingness to pun-
ish the media for harmful consequences. Therefore, if moral
obligation is linked to legal obligation, we would expect that
the stronger people's support for "impact" obligations, the
more likely they will be to support legal restrictions aimed at
preventing or punishing negative consequences. We might
also expect support for conduit obligations to be associated
with stronger support for press freedom than support for
impact obligations, although this would not necessarily suggest
the government's policies in times of crisis, and to avoid stories that could
stimulate a person to try something dangerous.
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that moral and legal obligation are unlinked. Rather, it may
suggest that respondents consider legal rights to be necessary
to ensure adequate performance of ethical duties.
C. Support for Press Freedom
Respondents were asked about their support for press
freedom by offering them a series of specific scenarios and ask-
ing them, from a legal standpoint, whom they would support in
each. Table 3 shows the items and the results. The items were
intended to tap into a variety of common conflicts between
press freedom and other important values. Among the com-
peting values were privacy and emotional tranquility, reputa-
tion, national security, national unity, public safety and
individual safety.
Two indices were created after factor analysis. One index
taps the degree to which respondents support the legal right of
the press to publish material critical of the government or pub-
lic officials. Another measures respondents' willingness to sup-
port freedom to criticize those not involved in government.
Willingness to support freedom of the press against claims of
national security was measured with the item asking respon-
dents whether they agreed that the news media should be
allowed to publish classified information unless there is proof
of certain and serious harm.
Willingness to support press rights against the privacy and
emotional tranquility of private individuals was examined by
presenting respondents with a scenario involving the right of
the media to publicize the name of a sexual assault victim
obtained from public records. Respondents were asked
whether they would support the media in litigation where the
victim was granted a prior restraint on dissemination of the
name, and whether they would support the media if the victim
sued for invasion of privacy. The responses to the two items
were then treated as individual indicators of support for press
freedom.
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TABLE 3
SUPPORT FOR PRESS FREEDOM
Item % Yes 7 No 5 Depends
It ought to be a crime for the media to publish editorials
sharply critical of a president's military strategy during
wartime.
The media should be allowed to publish editorials
suggesting that if the government is unable to act in the
people's best interest, we ought to do away with the
constitution and try communism.
A popular politician who made wholesome family life part
of his political image should be able to collect damages
from the news media who accurately report that he was
having an extra-marital affair during the campaign.
A magazine publishes a phony advertisement portraying a
nationally prominent fundamentalist minister as a drunkard
who had an incestuous relationship with his mother. The
minister should be allowed to collect damages from the
magazine even if no reader would take the advertisement as
literally true.
A person who is criticized in articles or editorials
disseminated by the news media should have a legal right
to have a free and unedited reply appear in the same media
that disseminated the criticism.
The news media should be allowed to publish the contents
of a classified government document leaked to the media by
a government employee unless the government can provide
overwhelming proof that national security will be harmed.
The government ought to be able to punish a highly
popular newspaper columnist who, in his morning column,
urges readers to arm themselves and use physical force to
stop a Ku Klux Klan march later that day.
A television network should be held legally responsible for
damages if a child is hurt while copying something
dangerous.he or she has seen in the network's
programming.
A newspaper publishes stories saying that your state senator
has taken bribes. The stories turn out to be false. The
senator should be able to win the libel suit against the
newspaper unless the newspaper can prove the stories are
true.
Suppose a reporter for a television station serving your
community examines court records that are legally open to
public inspection and thereby obtains the name of a 17-
year-old rape victim. Now suppose the victim discovers that
the station has her name and obtains a court order
forbidding the station from broadcasting her identity.
Would you support the television station's right to broadcast
the information?
Now suppose the victim doesn't know the station has her
name and that the station broadcasts it. The victim sues
the TV station for invasion of privacy. If the woman sues














*: Responses interpreted as support for press freedom. Percentages do not add to 100%
because respondents who failed to answer or said "don't know" were not included.
Finally, a crude overall index of support for press freedom
was created by summing respondents' scores on all of the items
pertaining to support for press freedom. The higher the total
score, the more a respondent supported press freedom.
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D. Controls
As a safeguard against finding spurious relationships, con-
trols were imposed for several other variables that might be
expected to affect support for press freedom. Among these
were gender, age, education, social ideology,68 degree of com-
munity involvement 69 and media use.7"
III. RESULTS
Table 4 shows the results of a regression analysis of the
relationship between the control variables and support for
press freedom, and between the moral obligation variables and
support for press freedom.7' The betas indicate the degree of
relationship between variables after controlling for the effects
of the other variables. 72 The R2 numbers indicate the percent-
68. Ideology was measured with the following question: "The terms
'liberal and conservative' may mean different things to different people
depending on the kind of issue one is considering. In terms of social issues
and people's behaviors, would you say you are ... [choices given were very
liberal, liberal, somewhat liberal, moderate, somewhat conservative,
conservative, very conservative]."
69. Community involvement was measured by asking respondents
whether, "over the past few years," they have ever done the following:
attended a city council meeting, hearing or legislative meeting; circulated a
petition for something you were interested in; contributed money to a
political or public interest campaign; worked with others in a group on some
local problems or issues; spoken up at public meeting; contacted a
government office or a government official.
70. Media use was measured by asking respondents how often they
read newspapers or watch television news and how attentive they are to
various types of material in newspaper and television news. A variety of other
possible control variables were rejected after preliminary analysis suggested
that they were of little value. Among them were respondents' like or dislike
of journalists, their degree of personal experience with journalists, their
previous litigation experience and general contentiousness, and income.
71. Multiple regression is a statistical technique that allows the
researcher to see the effect on a dependent variable resulting from change in
an independent variable, while controlling for the effects of other variables.
For example, regression allows us to see how much of the impact on overall
support for press freedom is explained by, say, the "performance gap"
variable after we have taken into account the effect of all the control variables.
72. The beta allows an inference about the impact on one variable of
changes in another. For example, it would enable us to predict the amount of
change in support for press freedom that would occur as a result of varying
the value placed on the informing function. Though suggestive, the betas
resulting from regression analysis may still not indicate causation. The
"simple r" is the so-called "zero-order" Pearson correlation coefficient. It
measures the strength of the relationship between two variables before taking
into account the impact of other variables. A correlation coefficient is not a
measure of causality. A positive coefficient indicates that as the value of one
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TABLE 4
PREDICTING SUPPORT FOR PRESS FREEDOM BY MEDIA
ROLE, PERFORMANCE GAP AND MEDIA
OBLIGATION (HIERARCHICAL
REGRESSION ANALYSIS)A
SUPPORT FOR RIGHT SUPPORT MEDIA
TO BROADCAST NAME IN PRIVACY SUIT
OVERALL SUPPORT OF ASSAULT VICTIM BY ASSAULT VICTIM
incr. incr. incr.




Sex (male) -. 00 -. 06 .04 .02 .04 .04
Age -. 13" -. 13' -. 12" -. 12' -. 03 -. 03
Education .29* .30** 10.2' .07 .06 2.0 .00 -. 00 0.2
Ideology & Activity
Ideo. Conservatism -. 23** -. 17"* -. 11 -. 08 -. 01 -. 01
Community Invlvmnt .17"* .10 3.5*" -. 02 -. 04 0.8 .02 .02 0.1
Media Use
Newspaper Use .13' .06 -. 00 -. 02 -. 01 -. 01
Television Use .03 -. 03 0.3 -. 01 .03 0.1 -. 03 -. 02 0.1
Media Role
Informing .09 .02 - .03 - .05 .04 .05
Activating -. 04 -. 02 0.1 .02 .04 0.4 -. 01 -. 01 0.2
Performance Gap .10 .03 0.1 -. 08 -. 09 0.8 .00 -. 00 0.0
Media Obligation
Impact -. 31" -. 22** -. 01 .03 -. 07 -. 07
Conduit .16"* .11" 5.3** -. 00 -. 00 0.1 .12' .14' 2.1
SUPPORT FOR RIGHT OF PRESS TO PUBLISH
CRITICISM CRITICISM CLASSIFIED
OF GOVERNMENT OF OTHERS DOCUMENTS
incr. incr. incr.
simple r beta R- simple r beta R 
2 simple r beta R 2Predictors
CONTROLS
Demographics
Sex (male) .01 -. 06 -. 04 -. 04 .08 .07
Age -. 15" -. 15"* .05 .05 .01 .01
Education .36** .37** 15.5"* -. 02 -. 01 0.5 .12" .11 1.8
Ideology & Activity
Ideo. Conservatism -. 21"* -. 13' -. 06 -. 07 -. 16"* -. 15'
Community Invlvmnt .18"* .08 2.2' .03 .04 0.6 .14* .11 3.1"*
Media Use
Newspaper Use .18"* .11 .04 .07 .10 -. 01
Television Use .03 -. 05 0.8 -. 00 -. 06 0.4 .13" .13 1.4
Media Role
Informing .19" .11" -. 12" -. 14' .05 -. 01
Activating -. 130 -. 10 2.2* .15"* .13' 3.5** .11 .10 0.9
Performance Gap .11 .04 0.2 -. 04 -. 06 0.4 .12' .08 0.7
Media Obligation
Impact -. 28"* -. 18"* -.04 -.04 -.14' -. 10
Conduit .24"* .19"* 5.8*" -. 12" -.140 2.0 .02 -.02 0.9
Notes:
* : p<.05 * : p<.01 n=300
a: The media role, performance gap and media obligation variables were entered into the
regression equation separately after the controls were imposed.
Predictors
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age of variance in the various support-for-press-freedom meas-
ures accounted for by the control and moral obligation
variables." Where the betas and R2's are statistically signifi-
cant-that .is, where we can be reasonably certain that the
results were not merely a matter of chance-they are marked
with asterisks.
Clearly, the control variables are powerful factors in
explaining overall support for press freedom, accounting for
fourteen percent of the variation in that variable. Particularly
influential are age, education and social ideology. Overall sup-
port for press freedom is especially strong among people who
are younger, better educated, and consider themselves liberal
on social issues.
The controls also explain nineteen percent of the variance
in public support for the media's freedom to criticize govern-
ment and public officials. However, social ideology is the only
control variable significantly related to support for publication
of classified documents. Again, liberalism is associated with
support for such freedom. The controls explain virtually none
of the variation in support for the news media in the privacy
scenario involving the sexual assault victim, or in support for
the press regarding the right of the press to criticize individuals
who are not public officials.
A. Media Roles and Performance Gap
Support for the informing role of the press is positively
associated with support for press freedom, but only in the con-
text of the right to criticize government. Conversely, support
for the activating role is associated with willingness to restrict
the press's legal freedom to criticize government. These find-
ings may suggest that support for opinion leadership by the
media is surprisingly shallow-applicable largely to opinion
that does not challenge the status quo-and that support for an
informing role may also be narrower than one might expect.
But most striking of all is the finding that, in the context of
non-governmental criticism, support for the two press roles is
related to support for press freedom in precisely the opposite
way as expected: the activating role is associated with greater
variable rises, the value of the other rises as well. A negative coefficient
indicates that as the value of one variable rises, the other falls.
73. For example, Table 4 shows an R2 value of 10.2 in the relationship
between the demographic controls and overall support for press freedom.
This means that of the total amount of variation we observed in overall
support for press freedom, just over 10% of it was explained by the
demographic factors.
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support for press freedom in this context, while the informing
role is associated with opposition to press rights."4
One possible explanation lies in the items comprising the
index used to measure support for criticism of non-govern-
mental individuals. One of the items focused on whether a per-
son criticized in the news media ought to have a legal right to
reply in the same media. If a respondent disagreed with such
an access right, we defined that as support for press freedom.
However, it is entirely possible that respondents might have
seen the access right as highly consistent with the informing
role.75 If so, the results suggest they are willing to favor legal
coercion to enhance the informing role.
Setting the larger indices aside, an examination of the rela-
tionships between individual items suggests that in the vast
majority of instances, respondents' valuing of press roles is not
strongly related to their support for press freedom. Where
there are reasonably strong relationships, they confirm the
finding that the more respondents consider the press obligated
to play an opinion leadership role, the less supportive they are
of press freedom. For example, the more important respon-
dents think it is for the press to promote projects that aid eco-
nomic development, the less likely they are to support the
press's right to criticize a president's military strategy in war or
to support the press's right to advocate communism. Yet
respondents' support for the "watchdog role" of the press has
virtually no relationship at all to support for press freedom.7b
74. This seemingly anomalous result has its parallel in the relationship
between the "conduit" ethical obligation and support for press freedom. As
support for conduit obligations increases, support for the legal right to
criticize government increases, but support for the right to criticize others
decreases.
75. The Pearson correlations show a negative relationship between the
right-of-reply item and both the informing role and conduit obligation. And
if we examine relationships between individual items, we find a statistically
significant and negative relationship between supporting the press on right of
reply and valuing the role of giving people a daily account of what is
happening in the world (r = -. 16, p < .05, after controlling for
respondents' age, education, ideology and community involvement). Put
differently, the more respondents value the "daily account" role, the more
they favor a right of reply. Likewise, the more they believe the press is
ethically obligated to provide balanced treatment to all groups and points of
view-a component of the conduit obligation-the more they favor a right of
reply. The data suggest that respondents may also have seen a right of access
to the media to be consistent with conduit ethical obligations.
76. The only exception involves the press's right to publish classified
information, which those who value the watchdog role are likely to support.
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As for the impact of "performance gap," no support was
found for the expectation that the more dissatisfied people are
with the performance of the press on roles they value highly,
the less supportive they will be of press freedom. Perhaps this
measure was too crude, and perhaps there was too little vari-
ance in respondents' rating of some of the roles. Nevertheless,
at least as performance gap was operationalized here, criticism
of the media for failure to fulfill its social roles did not translate
itself into willingness to use legal coercion against the press.
B. Ethical Obligations and Support for Press Freedom
The "ethical obligation" variables proved more useful.
With the exception of a negative relationship between conduit
obligations and support for press freedom, the results were as
expected. Where these moral obligation variables are con-
cerned, there appears to be linkage between ethical and legal
obligation. The ethical obligation variables explained a statisti-
cally significant amount of variation in support for press free-
dom in the majority of contexts.
There is support in the data for the proposition that the
more strongly people believe the media are obliged to consider
the impact of their actions, the more likely they will be to sup-
port legal restrictions aimed at preventing or punishing nega-
tive consequences. The stronger the respondents' belief in
impact obligations, the less they support overall press freedom,
including the press's right to criticize government and govern-
ment officials. Valuing impact obligations, however, is unre-
lated to support for the right of the press to publish a sexual
assault victim's name, the right to criticize non-governmental
individuals, or the right to publish classified documents.
The data quite strongly indicates that valuing conduit obli-
gations is associated with support for press freedom more than
valuing impact obligations. Across most measures, support for
conduit obligations translated itself into support for press free-
dom. Whether one looks at the overall measure, at support for
the press in the context of an invasion of privacy action by a
sexual assault victim, or at support for the right to criticize gov-
ernment, the result is as expected.
The most striking anomaly occurs in the context of sup-
port for the right of the press to criticize non-governmental
individuals. There, support for conduit obligations shows a
significant and negative relationship to support for press free-
dom.7 7 Again, there is reason to believe that the right-of-reply
77. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
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item made the results difficult to interpret, since opposing the
media and favoring a right of reply might understandably be
consistent with conduit obligations. Of course, this in itself
may suggest that if people highly value what they consider the
conduit obligations of the press, they are willing to use the law
to further fulfillment of those obligations.
Analyzing individual item relationships adds further
insight. It appears particularly clear that the more strongly
respondents believe the press is obliged to avoid rocking the
boat, the more willing they are to support legal control of the
press. Those who consider the press strongly obligated to
avoid using stories that might lead to community conflict are
likely to favor punishment for the columnist who urges readers
to physically stop a Klan march, to favor network liability for
copy-cat injuries suffered by children, to oppose the right of
the press to criticize the president's wartime strategy, and to
oppose the media's right to advocate communism. 78 There is
no relationship at all between the obligation to avoid commu-
nity conflict and support for a right of reply, perhaps an indica-
tion that respondents valuing this moral obligation are more
interested in squelching potentially inflammatory material than
in resolving differences through debate.
On the other hand, some of the relationships that would
seem to be logically inevitable did not materialize. For exam-
ple, valuing the obligation of the press to act as a representa-
tive of the public in seeking access to newsworthy information
and events had very little relationship to support for any type
of press freedom. 79 Nor was there any significant relationship
between valuing the moral obligation to "publish relevant
information about public figures even if the information is
highly personal" and support for the media in a lawsuit
brought by a popular politician who campaigns on family val-
ues and then has the media expose an extra-marital affair. And
there was no relationship between valuing the obligation to
"avoid stories that could stimulate a person to do something
dangerous," and willingness to hold a network responsible for
damages if a child is hurt while copying something dangerous
that appeared in networking programming.
78. The same general pattern appears in the relationship between these
media freedom variables and support for the moral obligation to mobilize
support for the government's policies in times of crisis, although most of
these relationships are not as strong.
79. The only exception was such respondents' significant reluctance to
side with a politician whose extra-marital affair was exposed by the media. It
may be that none of the press freedom items directly tapped the access issue.
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Of all the contexts, the sexual assault privacy scenario may
be the most peculiar in that none of the control or independent
variables show much relationship to support for the press in
this type of situation. In part, this may be due simply to the fact
that there may have been insufficient variance in that depen-
dent variable. Ninety percent of the respondents would uphold
the prior restraint on publication of the victim's name, and
three-fourths would support the victim in a privacy action.
Such results may suggest that respondents view privacy in the
sexual assault context as entirely out of the realm of press free-
dom and incapable of being counterbalanced by any other
interest. Nor is the study without methodological flaws. It
may, for example, have been a mistake to have told respon-
dents that a prior restraint had been granted before asking
them about their support for the rights of the press. Although
pretesting of the survey instrument revealed no problem, some
respondents may have assumed that the issue was primarily one
of whether to obey a court order, and not a press freedom issue
at all. This may be exactly why more respondents supported a
prior restraint than supported an action for damages.
In general, the fact that support for the media's legal rights
varies considerably across different contexts emphasizes the
multidimensionality of press freedom. Simply put, it means
strikingly different things to different people, and different
things to the same people under different circumstances.
CONCLUSIONS
Is there, then, empirical evidence of a relationship between
the public's views of the ethical and legal obligations of the
press? As is often the case with social scientific work, the
answer is a qualified "yes." The survey results contain suffi-
cient evidence for concern. A good many of the most direct
measures of respondents' feelings about the ethical obligations
of the press were found to be related to their support or oppo-
sition to the press's legal freedom. Yet, we must be cautious
about inferring causation in the relationships under study. We
know that certain variables are related, but we can be less cer-
tain about the direction of influence. Logic would suggest that
one first develops a view of how the media ought to behave and
then applies such a belief when resolving a concrete problem of
press freedom. But we cannot say with absolute certainty that
the process does not work the other way around.
Even if there is such a relationship in the public mind
between the moral and legal obligations of the press, a serious
question remains: does it matter? Cohen v. Cowles Media and
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Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc. were not decided on the
basis of public opinion polls. Nor is the First Amendment a
monument to majoritarianism.
For an answer, we must return to William Ernest Hocking
and the words with which this article began: "Law is the great
civilizing agent that it is... because it is a working partner with
the advancing ethical sense of the time.""0 Public views about
the moral obligations of the press, combined with journalists'
own articulation of these values, may indeed represent the
"advancing ethical sense of the time." Although there is no
overarching consensus among either the press or the public as
to all of the ethical obligations of the press, it may be no mere
coincidence that Cohen and Masson focused on alleged breaches
in ethical principles about which there is widespread
agreement.'
Further, there is evidence that, broadly considered, the
Supreme Court is no less a majoritarian institution than popu-
larly elected branches of government.8 2 One major study
recently concluded that three-fifths to two-thirds of the Court's
rulings have reflected prevailing public opinion.8 " In two-
thirds of the cases involving Bill of Rights or fourteenth
amendment claims and in sixty percent of free speech/press
cases, the Court has been found to be consistent with public
opinion on the issues under review.8 4
80. Hocking, supra note 1, at 258.
81. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
82. THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT
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decisions between 1935 and 1986. Id. at 71-72. For other studies finding a
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Federal Judicial Policy, 21 AM. J. POL. Sci. 567 (1977); James H. Kuklinski &
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One need not argue that there is a direct, unmediated rela-
tionship between public opinion and court decisions to assert
that public opinion is part of the socio-cultural milieu within
which judicial decisions are made, or a potential resource upon
which decision-makers might draw. 5 Such would seem all the
more likely where moral expectations of the news media, one
of the major vessels of public opinion, are involved, and where
journalists themselves publicly articulate, debate and defend
the ethical standards of their occupation.
In the last analysis, Cohen, Masson and a good many other
cases to come may be seen in part as the result-the cost, some
might say-of the media's acceptance of the premises of social
responsibility theory, of perceived or actual widespread public
and media agreement about certain standards of journalistic
behavior, and perhaps of journalists' failure to recognize the
delicate nature of the boundary between ethics and law.
Hocking described the process concisely:
In brief, law falls in behind the advance of ethical reflec-
tion, attempting to make unanimous in behavior what
ethical sense has made almost unanimous in motive, and
in so doing (a) to make the motivation itself more nearly
unanimous and (b) to transfer the released ethical energy
to a new level of issues, which in turn will eventually
become material for new law.
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Whether this development is good or bad is another question.
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